economic stress and uncertainty, it also meant that Korean banks could easily borrow. Not surprisingly, many had exceptionally large exposure to short-term foreign loans. When the rollover rate on those loans fell because of the global credit crunch, it resulted in repayment pressures (as the banks' weakened balance sheets fueled capital flight) and the eventual downturn in real economic activity. The experience of Korea underscores that although unrestricted crossborder capital flows provide rewards by giving greater financial depth to the recipient country, it also carries potential risks (as foreign residents can quickly withdraw their funds from the local financial markets). These risks are greatly magnified if the domestic banking sector becomes excessively exposed to shortterm foreign loans. Clearly, in times of economic uncertainty and stress, the risk and dangers of financial contagion becomes amplified. 24 An unintended outcome of the policy was that many Korean households and small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) have become heavily indebted as Korean banks with access to cheap credit funneled funds to the SMEs and households. 25 Myung-koo Kang notes that "for the past decade, gross foreign debt has increased about 2.3 times-from $163.8 billion to $380.5 billion in 2008.
During the same period, short-term foreign debt has increased from $39.5 billion to $151.0 billion, and its proportion in the gross external debt has also increased. will save roughly half the amount that Americans do. In the face of the financial crisis, as banks limit access to credit, there is likely to be a rise in personal and small business bankruptcies." 28 Global risk-aversion and the resultant drop in capital flows caused by global deleveraging following the collapse of Lehman severely impacted South Korean financial institutions. Like everywhere else, the global credit crunch made it extremely difficult for local banks to acquire dollars and other foreign currency needed to refinance activities such as foreign-denominated loans to the domestic SMEs.
Korean banks, which had accumulated substantial short-term foreign currency debt, have been hit particularly hard by the external shocks as both the domestic and foreign exchange liquidity tightened for banks with large financing needs.
Moreover, as foreign investors began to retrench from Korea and with dollar assets leaving the country (and the global credit markets freezing up during the peak of the crisis), asset prices dropped sharply and Korean banks found it exceedingly difficult to access dollars to repay maturing dollar loans. 29 As the dollar liquidity strains spilled over into the local currency markets, banks became even more cautious about extending loans on concerns of worsening asset quality. At the peak of the crisis, as foreign investors withdrew funds en masse from domestic equity and bond markets (because of heightened risk aversion), the resultant foreign capital outflows not only caused a steep decline in the stock market but also led to a substantial depreciation of the exchange rate with the won depreciating some 40 percent. In early October 2008, the won fell to a low as 1,484.90 per dollar-its weakest rate since the Asian crisis in 1997. 30 The derivatives, originally put in circulation to reduce risks caused by a rise in the value of the won versus the U.S. dollar has become a liability as the won's sharp depreciation against the dollar further increased the cost of servicing foreign debt.
The traditional trade channel also became a problem for South Korea Korea is spending more on goods, services and investments from overseas than it sells abroad.
Moderately Impacted: India and China

India
The Indian economy was better able to withstand the crisis for two major reasons. First, its financial sector was not exposed to the U.S. subprime mortgages securities, 35 and, second, active policy interventions in both the monetary and financial sectors adopted by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) kept the banking sector "protected" from the global financial markets. 36 As a result, not only India's state-owned banks still hold about 70 percent of the nation's banking assets, the country's financial sector is relatively insulated because none of the major Indian banks have much exposure to U.S. subprime mortgage debt, including limited off-balance sheet activities or securitized assets. 37
Indian banks do not have toxic assets because credit default swaps were not permitted in the country.
The State Bank of India, the ICICI Bank (the country's largest private bank), the Bank of Baroda, and Although these strengths explain the relatively moderate impact of the crisis on these two giants, the fact is that neither country was completely immune. What explains this, and what has been the nature and extent of the impact? In short, the contagion was transmitted via both "broad" and "specific" channels. 46 Broadly, no country can remain immune from a crisis emanating from the United States, the world's largest and most powerful economy. Indeed, the rapid global spread of the crisis unambiguously underscores that in today's interconnected world, no country is an island.
Closely integrated financial and banking systems and deepening trade interdependence has meant that even countries not at the epicenter of the problem (in this case, directly exposed to the toxic subprime assets originating from the United States) became extremely vulnerable to the financial package has ten targeted spending items, including construction/expansion projects of railways (more than $200 billion), highways, airports, city subways, and nuclear power plants. It also promises to increase investment in the public health-care system, education, and subsidized housing, and raise unemployment and other welfare benefits. Moreover, value-added taxes are to be phased out and replaced by corporate income taxes. Without doubt, unemployment remains a big concern.
According to the government, with demand for Chinese exports evaporating, as many as 26 million of China's estimated 130 million migrant workers are now unemployed. 56 To boost domestic demand and create jobs, on January 21, 2009, Beijing announced extra spending of 850 billion RMB over three years to improve health care. Also, beginning in February 2009, rural residents received a 13 percent rebate on purchases of goods such as refrigerators, televisions, and washing machines.
To help the property sector, minimum down payments have been reduced from 30-40 percent of a home's value to 20 percent, and the transaction tax has been waived for properties held for at least two years. However, without effective privatization of state and collective-owned land and state assets the stimulus efforts will be a one-time boost only.
It is well known that China's private consumption has failed to grow, not because Chinese consumers do not like to purchase goods and spend on vacations, but because most do not own property and collateral asset. Most households are wage-earners who have not felt enough "wealth effect" to boost their consumption. Unless these concerns are effectively dealt with they will not be spending their rainy day savings anytime soon. It also means that financial stimulus (despite its size) is a one-time shot designed to alleviate immediate problems in the economy by giving it a boost.
More sustained growth must come less from capital infusion but more from productivity growth.
Arguably, it would be prudent for China to adopt a more flexible exchange rate. 57 After all, China's emphasis on exchange rate stability in the face of rising current account surpluses has not only generated intense protectionist pressures in the United States and elsewhere, 58 it has also forced the central bank to accumulate massive foreign exchange reserves with negative domestic consequences. Preventing the RMB from rising against the dollar means that China's central bank has to print more money to keep interest rates low, and this strategy can also exacerbate the problem of inflation if more money ends up chasing too few goods. It also means that China is exposed to large capital losses on its foreign reserve holdings (which are largely held in U.S. dollars) as the RMB appreciates. Moreover, an appreciation of the exchange rate would also boost domestic consumption-something China needs. prudent by saving or by consuming less. 62 If this trend holds, the growth of Asian manufacturing, especially exports could be structurally lower and Asia's export-led growth strategy may no longer as critical as in the past. As it is likely that global demand for Asian produced goods will remain suppressed for the foreseeable future, the region's longer-term recovery will mean that its traditional reliance on export-promotion as the driver for growth will have to diminish. This means that countries (big and small) will need to adapt and rebalance growth away from exports and more toward domestic demand in order to generate sustainable growth rates. 63 In China and India this could be partly achieved by building stronger social protection systems that will reduce the need for precautionary savings to meet needs related to health, education, and retirement. Similarly, domestic exchange rate appreciation can also help, as it will provide price incentives to shift resources toward production for domestic use and by raising real household income. This in turn will spur domestic consumption. Externally, greater regional-level coordination to help recovery and generate growth is essential. On 
